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AI in Markets Checklist

Prompt Injection Defense for Finance Agents

A finance agent that retrieves documents or takes user input is an attack surface, and a successful injection can exfiltrate data or trigger a trade. This checklist hardens the pipeline against injection specifically, complementing the broader deployment checklist.

By AI Fin Hub Research · AI Fin Hub Team

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Checklist Sections

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Section 1

Phase 1: Trust boundaries

3 items
Use The ToolPlaygrounds

Prompt Injection Tester

Red-team a finance agent against 24 documented prompt-injection attacks — direct override, role confusion, indirect injection via retrieved content.

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Use The ToolPlaygrounds

Price-Blind Research Auditor

Paste a research prompt or agent context bundle. The auditor flags price numbers, directional words, and outcome-leaking phrases that cause LLMs.

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Section 2

Phase 2: Least privilege

3 items

Section 3

Phase 3: Output and data controls

3 items
Use The ToolPlaygrounds

Structured Schema Validator for Finance

Paste LLM JSON output and validate against four pre-built finance schemas — research output, trade decision, risk snapshot, peer comparison — with sanity.

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Section 4

Phase 4: Red-teaming

3 items
Use The ToolPlaygrounds

Prompt Regression Tester

Run the same prompt against multiple models (Claude 4.5/4.6/4.7, GPT-5, Gemini 2.5) with your own keys. Diff outputs, score drift, catch regressions.

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Pro Tips

Small moves that make the checklist easier to finish

Indirect injection is the attack that gets missed. The hostile instruction does not come from the user, it comes from a document the agent was told to read, which is exactly the content you trust by default.
Least privilege is the only defense that holds when prevention fails. Assume an injection will eventually succeed and design so that when it does, the model simply cannot reach anything that matters.
Never put a credential in the model context. The cleanest exfiltration defense is having nothing to exfiltrate, so keep secrets in the deterministic layer the model cannot see.

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Planning estimates only — not financial, tax, or investment advice.